I. INTRODUCTION
In three situations, a defendant in a state court may transfer the lawsuit to a federal court. When a plaintiff files a lawsuit in state court that presents a question of federal law or involves parties who reside in different states, the defendant may file a notice of removal in the state court and another notice of removal in-a federal court to transfer the case from the state court to the federal court., In a third situation, if a plaintiff files a lawsuit in state court that presents a question of state law and neither presents a question of federal law nor involves parties who reside in different states, the doctrine of "complete preemption" allows the defendant to transfer the case to a federal court, if a federal statute completely encompasses the subject matter of the state law. 
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The federal courts do not agree on whether the doctrine of complete preemption applies to the Copyright Act-that is, whether the Copyright Act so completely covers the field of copyright law that a defendant may remove a lawsuit that presents questions of state law that involve copyright-protected material.3 The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have held that the Copyright Act (the Act)4 completely blankets the field of copyright law.s Thus, in these circuits, the doctrine of complete preemption allows a defendant to remove a case from a state court to a federal court if the plaintiff presents a question of state law that the Copyright Act covers. 6 The Third Circuit has held that the Copyright Act does not completely blanket the field of copyright law.7 In the remaining circuits, a problem faces the district courts: should the doctrine of complete preemption apply to the Copyright Act to allow defendants to transfer cases from state court to federal court?8 Part I of this Article addresses the battle that ensues when defendants try to transfer a case from state court to federal courts. It also discusses that plaintiffs tend to prefer state court and addresses the reasons that motivate plaintiffs to file cases in state court. Part I also addresses defendants' preference for federal courts as well as the factors that animate this preference. Defendants often try to transfer lawsuits from state court to federal court, and the considerations that these defendants must take into account are discussed.9 Similarly, a plaintiff usually attempts to return a case to state court if the defendant successfully 
architects in San Diego Superior Court and asserted eight state law claims, including misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. 21 The architects, Jon Baker and Richard Nowicki, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, and NTD Architects filed a motion to remand the lawsuit to the San Diego Superior Court on the grounds that the Southern District of California did not have jurisdiction. 22 Baker and Nowicki opposed the motion to remand on the grounds that the Copyright Act completely preempted the state law claims because the Copyright Act broadly covered the field of copyright law and the claims concerned copyright-protected material, such as computer files.23 The Southern District of California agreed with arguments of Baker and Nowicki and concluded that the doctrine of complete preemption applied to the Copyright Act.24 The court decided that the Copyright Act preempted the conversion claim and therefore that Baker and Nowicki properly removed the lawsuit. 25 Part IV of this Article examines the decision of the Southern District of California. Some scholars dislike the doctrine of complete preemption because it increases the caseload of federal courts. 26 Part IV examines whether the court adequately considered this argument and other arguments. The court ultimately decided that the doctrine rests on solid footing and assessed whether to apply the doctrine to the Copyright Act.27 Courts use one of two tests to decide whether to extend the doctrine to the Copyright Act: the older "congressional intent" test 28 or the newer "exclusive federal cause of action" test.
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In this case, the court examined whether Congress intended the Copyright Act to cover copyright law so broadly that the Act would preempt similar 21 Id. at *1. 22 Id. at *1-2. The Court found that Congress expressed this kind of intent in two provisions.31 Part IV assesses whether the court correctly decided to use the older congressional intent test and the effect of this decision on the evolution of the complete preemption doctrine. Part IV also evaluates whether Congress intended the Copyright Act to play the role of a completely preemptive statute. Finally, Part IV addresses whether the court correctly decided that the Copyright Act completely preempted the conversion claim.
The court's opinion leaves many other questions unanswered, and Part V address these questions. The court decided that the Copyright Act did not completely preempt the other seven claims;32 it did not, however, provide a detailed explanation for this decision.33 Why did the court find that the Copyright Act does not completely preempt a misappropriation of trade secrets claim?34 Why did the court find that the Act does not completely preempt a breach of fiduciary duty claim?5 Part V assesses these and other questions in light of the competing arguments of.scholars and other courts and attempts to provide guidance to practitioners.
II. WHY PRACTITIONERS BATTLE OVER FORUM: PLAINTIFFS PREFER STATE COURT, AND DEFENDANTS PREFER FEDERAL COURT
Plaintiffs and defendants prefer different courts. Plaintiffs counsel usually feels more comfortable with state court procedures.36 Defendant's counsel often believes that federal courts have more expertise in federal copyright law.37 Thus, defense lawyers often try to remove the case to a federal court and must consider several factors. The plaintiffs lawyer then usually attempts to remand the case to state court. COMPLETE PREEMPTIONAND COPYRIGHT lawsuits in state court. 46 Indeed, defendants regularly remove cases to take the plaintiff to the less familiar forum of federal court. 47 Defendants also feel that federal judges are better informed;48 specifically, defendants value federal court judges' expertise in cases that present questions of federal law.49 Furthermore, some lawyers believe that federal courts favor defendants' motions for summary judgment more than plaintiffs'.o
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C. NOTICE OF REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT
Although federal courts provide several advantages to defendants, defendants must consider several factors when evaluating whether to remove a case to federal court. 51 Deborah Pearce Reggio has outlined these considerations.52
First, defendants must consider the jury.53 Specifically, defendants must consider "the geographic scope of the pools, the number of jurors required to reach a verdict, and the rules governing jury demand in each forum."54 Second, defendants must consider the rules of civil procedure.55 Defendants must evaluate their "familiarity with the respective procedural rules, the time frame and production requirements of each court, each court's general treatment of motion practice, and the various disclosure and discovery rules."6 Third, defendants must consider the judge.57 Specifically, defendants must consider the caseloads of the available judges, the familiarity of the judges with files, the circumstances of the appointments of judges, and the rules that govern the removal of judges; these factors impact the advantages of the assigned judgeS 46 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 598 (finding that removal lowers the win rate of the plaintiff). 47 See id. at 599 (observing that removal "dislodg[es]" the plaintiff from a familiar forum and "revers[es] the ... differences in procedural law that led the plaintiff to prefer state court"). 48 Reggio, supra note 37, at 97. 
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If a defendant considers all of the above-mentioned factors and decides to remove a case to federal court, then the plaintiff typically files a motion to remand the case to state court. The ensuing battle sometimes lasts years. 59 The delay helps defendants, buying more time to build their defense.60 Consequently, if a plaintiff files a case in a state court, the defendant oftentimes removes the case to a federal court. "Implied preemption" signifies that the federal law does not plainly say that it overrides similar state laws.72 Both express preemption and implied preemption provide defenses to a defendant,73 but they do not allow a defendant to remove a case in a state court to a federal court. 3. Complete Preemption. Complete preemption, however, empowers a defendant to remove a case from state court to federal court. 75 The removal statute generally allows a defendant to transfer a case from state court to a federal court if it raises a federal claim76--the "well-pleaded" complaint rule provides that the plaintiffs complaint must expressly present a federal question to allow the defendant to remove the case. Thus, a plaintiff who files a lawsuit that relies exclusively on state law generally prevents removal of the case. 77 The doctrine of complete preemption, however, provides an exception or corollary to this rule.78 If the complaint includes a state law claim and a federal statute extraordinarily broadly covers the subject matter of the state law claim, then the doctrine allows the defendant to remove the entire lawsuit to a federal court. If a defendant removes a case in a state court to a federal court and asserts that the doctrine of complete preemption allows him to remove the case because a federal statute extraordinarily broadly covers a state law claim, then the federal district court applies one of the two tests to determine if the complete preemption doctrine applies to the statute. The Supreme Court has decided that the doctrine applies to the Labor Management Relations Act,88 the Employee Retirement Security Act,89 and the National Bank
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Moreover, the four circuits used different tests to determine whether the complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act-two circuits96 applied the congressional intent test, and two circuits97 applied the exclusive federal cause of action test-which leaves courts in the remaining circuits with a split of persuasive authority on which test to apply and whether the doctrine applies to the Copyright Act.
Courts and practitioners in most circuits face a problem: does the complete preemption doctrine apply to the Copyright Act?
The arguments of commentators and judges provide practitioners with the tools to advocate either that the doctrine applies to the Copyright Act or that it does not. A defendant who seeks to remove a case on the grounds that the complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act needs to show (1) that the complete preemption doctrine as a whole rests on solid footing, (2) that one of the tests best animates the doctrine, and (3) that the chosen test shows that the doctrine applies to the Copyright Act.98 Conversely, a plaintiff who seeks to remand a case to state court needs to show (1) that the doctrine rests on shaky footing, (2) that neither test functions, and that that even if the court still applies the tests, the doctrine does not apply to the Copyright Act.99
Perspectives on Complete Preemption in General.
Competing theories explain the legal basis for the complete preemption doctrine.
Judges and commentators disagree on the language of complete preemption. Under one perspective, the complete preemption doctrine provides an "exception"100 to the well-pleaded complaint rule-the well-pleaded complaint rule allows the defendant to remove a case only if the complaint plainly asserts a question of federal law.101 Under this perspective, the complete preemption doctrine provides an unwarranted exception to the long-standing rule that a defendant cannot remove a case that merely asserts state law claims.102 Under 
COMPLETE PREEMPTIONAND COPYPJGHT
another perspective, the doctrine provides a "corollary"103 to the well-pleaded complaint rule-that is, the doctrine merely "recharacterizes" state law claims as federal law claims if a federal statute broadly covers the subject matter.
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Although most perspectives address a particular test-the congressional intent test or the exclusive federal cause of action test-some perspectives address the doctrine as a whole. For instance, in one view, "Congress would do well to eliminate a doctrine that is contrary to sound jurisdictional theory, exceedingly difficult to apply, and the bane of judges and litigants alike."s05 In another view, however, the doctrine rests on a solid rationale: it "unmask [ However, many criticize the test. Justice Scalia authored a dissent in BenefialNaionalBank v. Anderson, where the court created the test. He asserted that the test does not justify an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule and called the complete preemption doctrine a "federalize-and-remove dance."o1n Other critics disapprove of the fact that the test permits removal "in any circumstance in which federal law provides someone a cause of action and also precludes state law causes of action."124 Still, others maintain that the test raises concerns because it expands federal jurisdiction and does not require "express congressional authorization."125 Thus, the test fails to respect the autonomy of state courts and the tradition that only Congress has the power to limit this autonomy.1 26 Other perspectives assert that the exclusive federal cause of action test lacks a rationale.127 Under one view, the test lacks a coherent theory because the Supreme Court did not heed the basic principles that underlie federal question jurisdiction-that is, the "relationship between preemption, federal jurisdiction, and the interest in a uniform interpretation of federal law."128 Moreover, the test arguably lacks a rationale that addresses litigants' need to avoid state courts in some instances in order to "sidestep" state court bias.129 Another view asserts that the test fails to explain why an exclusive federal cause of action triggers complete preemption. 130 Further, some commentators attack the mechanics of the exclusive federal cause of action test.
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' Under this view, the test needs a criterion that expressly requires a "full substantive analysis to determine jurisdiction." As is, the test arguably impedes judicial efficiency. are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State."). [B]reach of implied contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract, deceptive trade practices, unjust enrichment/misappropriation/unfair competition, negligent failure to acknowledge one work is based on another, conversion,. . . declaration of ownership of rights in a work, a claim for slander of title based on allegations of ownership,. . . a right of publicity claim over use of a fictional character.162
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Conversely, in other cases, courts have applied the two-prong test and held that the Copyright Act does not completely preempt and therefore does not allow removal of the following state law claims:
[B]reach of contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, fraud and civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of a confidential relationship, promissory estoppel, deceptive trade practices, misrepresentation, failure to pay royalties or to account for profits earned by a co-owner of the copyright, unfair competition/unjust enrichment/misappropriation, trade secret misappropriation, right of privacy, right of publicity, defamation, and conversion.163 
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J. INTELL PROP. L e. Views on Complete Preemption in the Copynight Act Context.
Critics of the complete preemption doctrine in the copyright context assert a number of views. Some commentators assert that complete preemption in the copyright context often leaves the plaintiff without a remedy.164 Others argue that Congress expressly provided for removal in various statutes but not in the Copyright Act because Congress did not intend to extend complete preemption to the Copyright Act.16s Further, some scholars criticize the extra element test; they assert that courts misconstrue the test and overlook the elements and instead scrutinize the underlying facts and wrongly assess if the facts give rise to a copyright claim. 166 The Sixth Circuit has further identified additional problems with the extra element test:
The problem with this test is that it does not provide any real guidance to the courts. There is always some difference between the state law and the Copyright Act, so a court that wants to avoid preemption can always find some difference, however small, that is the 'extra element' needed to avoid preemption.167
A few scholars, however, defend complete preemption in the copyright context. For example, under one view the complete preemption doctrine provides a reasonable exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Indeed, in the copyright context, parties often assign and license rights in contracts, and the circumstances often involve significant federal interests.168
Commentators also offer various suggestions to improve the doctrine in the copyright context. In one view, courts simply need to rigorously apply the extra element test and focus on the elements of the state law cause of action, rather than the underlying facts.169 Moreover, the doctrine arguably needs a stronger standard to ensure that courts do not override the traditional values of jurisdiction.170 164 Helmer, supra note 70, at 217. 165 Amy J. Everhart 5 1338(a)."198 First, the court followed the analysis of the Fourth Circuit and noted the broad nature of the preemption provision in 5 301(a).199 The court agreed with the Rosdspyeski court that the broad nature of the provision showed that "Congress has clearly indicated that state law claims which come within the subject matter of copyright law and which protect rights equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the scope of federal copyright law . .. should be litigated only as federal copyright claims."200 Second, the court considered § 1338(a) and agreed with the Fourth Circuit that "the grant of exclusive original jurisdiction over copyright claims to the district courts [provides] strong evidence that Congress intended copyright litigation to take place in federal courts."201 Thus, the court concluded that the complete doctrine applied to the Copyright Act 
V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The VTD Architects decision in particular .and the jurisprudence of the complete preemption doctrine in the copyright context in general leave many unanswered questions. First, the District Court for the Southern District of California did not explain why seven of NTD Architects' claims contained an extra element, and the omission glares because the court granted removal of the entire case on the ground that the one claim of conversion did not contain an extra element.249 Why. does a breach of contract claim contain an extra element? Why does a misappropriation of trade secrets claim contain an extra element? The NTD Architects court noted that some courts find that a breach of contract 241 NTD Architects, 2012 WL 2498868, at *7. 242 Id 243 Id. at *7-8. 244 Id. at *8. 
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claim contains an extra element,250 and it declined to consider decisions where courts found that a breach of contract claim does not contain an extra element. Practitioners ought to look to these cases to bolster their arguments. Second, the NTD Architects court did not acknowledge the exclusive federal cause of action test and offers no guidance on this opinion. Practitioners ought to argue that one test applies and shows that the complete preemption doctrine extends or does not extend to the Copyright Act.
Third, the NTC Architects court concluded that 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) and 28 U.S.C. 1338(a) show that Congress intended to allow the complete preemption doctrine to apply to the Copyright Act,251 but the court did not consider that practitioners who seek to argue that Congress did not intend the Copyright Act to cover state law claims that barely relate to copyright law-that is, Congress did not intend the complete preemption doctrine to apply to the Copyright Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although NTD Architects v. Baker leaves many unanswered questions, the case highlights the fact that plaintiffs prefer state courts and defendants prefer federal courts. It also illustrates that practitioners capable of arguing the pros and cons of the complete preemption doctrine in general, and the doctrine in the copyright context in particular, enjoy greater success in removing a case to federal court or remanding a case to state court. NTD Architects filed their case in state court and presumably felt more comfortable in that venue. The architectural firm perhaps hoped to avoid the bias of federal courts, which often favor defendants. Naturally, Baker and Nowicki transferred the case to federal court, as statistics show that defendants fare better in federal court. 254 Although the District Court for the Southern District of California held that the complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act,255 many commentators dislike the complete preemption doctrine either as a whole or one of its two tests, while others argue that the doctrine simply does not apply 
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